INTRODUCTION
In a fuel reprocessing facility, there might be some possibilities for accidents such as criticality, fire, explosion and leakage, since various radioactive fissile materials are processed in variety of chemical and physical properties or forms in conjunction with flammable solvents. Take chemical explosion, for example, the nitrate such as UO2(NO3)2, Pu(NO3)4, Th(NO3), with the TBP compound in the presence of organic diluent have been experimentally studied so far to examine the red oil formation which decomposes exothermically at elevated temperatures, ranging from 130 to 150dc(1)~(5). As reported in connection with the red oil formation, were some accidents in USA, such as the TNX evaporator explosion of SRP (Savannah River Plant) in 1953 (6) , and the U concentrator incident of Hanford in 1953 (7) , and the A-line denitrator explosion/fire of SRP in 1975(8).
In Japanese reprocessing facilities, the "defence in depth" design philosophy has been advocated in the basic safety design, so that adequate safety margins and vital countermeasures could be realized to prevent abnor-* Tokai-mura , Ibaraki-ken 319-11. ** IndustriestraBe 13 , D-8755 Alzenau, GERMANY.
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851 mal event occurrences leading to the above accidents. For example, for "safety related facilities" : (1) some redundant systems could be adopted to improve their operational reliabilities; (2) an enforced monitoring system would be provided to immediately detect anomaly occurrences and thereby to take safety measures ; and (3) adequate quality assurance programs could manage the facilities in each stage of design, construction and operation.
As a result, the occurrence probabilities of such accidents as described above are supposed to be a very small level ; yet, none the less, it is very important to check the probabilities quantitatively, and make them as low as practically achievable.
In this report, a fault tree analysis method is applied exemplarily to a system anomaly liable to lead to a red oil explosion in a model Pu evaporator of a typical civilian reprocessing facility.
And the safety margin taken for modern reprocessing facilities including Japanese one is shown to be adequate by evaluating the occurrence frequency of the system anomaly described above.
Model plant data, component failure behavior data and other relevant data were developed by NUKEM GmbH, Germany. The fault tree analysis code FTL, which was also developed by NUKEM GmbH, is adaptive for application to diversified nuclear fuel facilities with a rigorous fault tree data management. These data and the computer code were originally prepared for German PSE (Projekt Sicherheitsstudien Entsorgung) which aimed at preparation of safety evaluation methods for nuclear fuel cycle back-end facilities in 1985, and the information is partially available to the public (9) . At JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute), they have been introduced and improved to fit Japanese situation of related facilities with some results reported (10,(11) . For example, human error data have been modified in the present analysis to show applicability to the Japanese facilities.
II. MODEL PLANT DESCRIPTION
In the reprocessing facility, after some four years of radioactive decay, fuel assemblies are sheared, dissolved and reprocessed. A typical Pu purification and evaporation system forms the basis for the analysis as considered in the PSE project, especially the relevant part of a 350 t/yr reprocessing plant design.
The main system considered in the analysis is the Pu evaporator in which the Pu product stream from the final Pu purification cycle is concentrated prior to feeding to the Pu storage system.
The system anomaly leading to the red oil explosion is assumed to occur by transfer of solvent phase material into the evaporator from upstream equipments and hence the analysis also includes consideration of the final pulsed column of the Pu purification cycle, a mixer settler and a series of buffer storage and analysis tanks.
Concerning the necessary services to this area of plant, only the evaporator hot water supply system is considered in detail.
Pu Purification Cycle
The main components of the latter section of the final Pu purification cycle are a pulsed column PPBS and a kerosene wash mixer settler PPBK as shown in Fig. 1 .
The function of the PPBS column is the final removal of U from the aqueous Pu product stream into a 30% tri-butyl phosphate in odorless kerosene (TBP/OK) solvent stream. The aqueous Pu stream is continuously removed from the base of the column by airlift and fed via a break pot into the mixer settler PPBK.
The PPBK is a four stage mixer settler in which the aqueous Pu stream is contacted with kerosene to remove dissolved TBP.
Pu Oxidation System
The aqueous Pu stream flows under gravity from PPBK into the POBKA collection vessels in the Pu oxidation system. The three POBKA collection vessels are equipped with density measuring instrumentation.
The aqueous Pu stream is continuously removed from the POBKA vessels and fed into the oxidation stage ROXI where the Pu is reoxidized from Pu(III) to Pu(IV). The Pu stream leaves the oxidation stage and flows by gravity into the three POBKB collection vessels in which liquid density measurement 95- 
General Treatment of Probability Data
The failure behavior of a component is described by the failure rate. In this study, the application of the exponential distribution where Ni is the number of failures for all components of type i in Tij, and the Tij the observation period of the individual component j.
The primary source of data for the study is obtained from German collection(12) of German power plant data and other published reports including WASH-1400(13).
2. Repair Times Repair times are generally available only as estimates and are to some extent dependent on the particular strategy adopted in the operating plant. For the fault tree analyses, mean time to repair (MTTR) is given together with a failure rate as input data for a basic event.
3. Failure Probability on Demand
The probability of failure on demand is used for the failure behavior of reserve components and given together with MTTR as input data for the fault tree analyses.
It is defined as the average unavailability of the components for which the following approximation applies, where the average down time for inspected components Ta, is taken to be a half of the inspection interval of Ti (720 h).
Common-mode Failures
The 9 factor method is applied to take account of common mode failures. For this fault tree analysis, a global b factor of 0.1 has been adopted for the calculation of all common mode failures(14).
5. Operator Error General estimates of error probability from literature have been applied as follows :
(1) 3.0 x 10-3 for errors of omission, where items omitted are embedded in a procedure.
98-(2) 1.0 x 10-2 for failure to act correctly fter the first several hours in a high stress condition. (3) 1.0 x 10-1 for failure to act correctly after the first 30 min in an extreme stress condition.
IV. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS USED IN ANALYSIS
The following assumptions have been made on the analysis :
(1) Failure of services such as compressed air, electrical supply result in plant shut down and hence are not included in the analysis. All valves, airlifts etc. are arranged to fail safe positions on loss of the services.
(2) Failures are not discriminated with regards to the likely quantity of organic phase which may subsequently be fed to the PP4AF Pu evaporator.
(3) The condition for formation and explosive decomposition of the red oil depends on the composition of organic solvent, the amount of TBP, plutonium nitrate (Pu(NO3)4) and conditions of temperature and pressure inside the evaporator. Hence, the top event of fault tree is defined to be a system anomaly (an event that organic solvent, TBP and Pu nitrate are present by system errors liable to lead to the formation of red oil and these are to be heated to a critical temperature assumed for initiating the most probable red oil decomposition in the Pu evaporator). (4) A number of experimental results show that the red oil decomposes exothermically at elevated temperatures, ranging from 130 to 150dc(1)~(5), and hence the above mentioned critical temperature is assumed to be 150dc. (5) Component failures resulting in solvent carry over into the evaporator are considered as initiating events, because the solvent itself has a possibility to initiate an explosive decomposition, hence the frequency data are given to the corresponding basic events in the fault tree analyses.
(6) Plant control and instrumentation is considered only to a limited extent in the analysis.
V. SCENARIO IDENTIFICATION AND FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION
As stated in the General Assumptions (Chap. IV), due to complex mechanism for formation of the red oil and its explosive decomposition, solvent (TBP) carry over into the evaporator (G002) and heating the complex to a temperature greater than 150dc (G003) combine via the AND gate G001 to the top event "System anomaly liable to lead to red oil explosion in PP4AF Pu evaporator" as shown in Fig. 5 . Solvent carry over into the evaporator (G002) solely could result in a red oil explosion, and is brought about from initiating events such as failures resulting in gross losses of solvent into the Pu-product stream (G004) or a gradual accumulation in the collection vessels (POBKA, POBKB) between the PPBK mixer-settler and the PP4AF evaporator and subsequent carry over (G005).
For TBP to reach the evaporator due to gross losses of solvent into the Pu-product stream (G004), a number of failures must combine as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . These are ; (1) failures resulting in TBP in the Pu-product stream beyond the PPBX mixer-settler (G008), (2) presence of solvent in the collection/analysis tanks not detected by density instrumentation (G010), (3) presence of TBP not detected in the sample from the analysis tank POBKPA (G011). The first two failures (G074) may occur due to multiple faults in the PP and PO cycles including initiating events, e.g. PP column flooding etc., and failure of corrective action, e.g. alarm failures such that the operator is not alerted to the abnormal plant condition.
The third failure (G011) is due either to failures associated with the sampling system or operator errors resulting in the batch of Pu-product stream being transferred to the evaporator without due account to the analysis results as shown in Fig. 7 .
Carry over of TBP due to gradual accumulation in the POBKA collection tanks is considered at G005. The collection tanks POBKA/B are not completely emptied during normal operation to ensure the retention of any accumulated solvent phase. The tank level control instrumentation provides for automatic shut-off of the airlift on reaching a set low level. Failures of this safeguard on both of the tanks POBKA and POBKB in this order result in carry over of TBP into the evaporator feed tank (G013) as shown in Fig. 8 . For the accumulated solvent phase to be fed to PP4AF, the additional failure to detect TBP in the sample from the analysis tank (G011) must occur.
For a thermal runaway reaction or explosion to occur, the complex must be heated to greater or equal to 150dc (G003) in accordance with the assumption made in the previous chapter. To heat the complex to the critical temperature, two further fault conditions are (1) failure of the hot water system temperature control resulting in heating water supplied at 150dc or more (G006) as shown in Fig. 9 , and (2) continued operation of the evaporator with subsequent concentration (G007) as shown in Fig. 10 until a liquor temperature of 150dc is reached. As shown in Fig. 11 , excessive high temperature of heating water to the evaporator is caused by leakage in the heat exchanger, or by temperature control loop failure with simultaneous failure of steam supply isolation valves.
VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The frequency of occurrence of the system anomaly of the solvent carry over in the PP4AF evaporator which is simultaneously heated up over 150dc, has been evaluated to be 2.6 x 10-11/yr, well less than the absolute limit for public acceptance which might be set as 1 x 10-6/yr. In order to gain a better understanding of the result, particular "branches" of the fault tree have been separately evaluated as follows.
Evaluation of Gate G008 determined the frequency of initiating events in the PPBS column or PPBX mixer settler resulting in solvent in Pu product stream to PP4AF evaporator as ca. 3 x 10-2/yr. This frequency is fairly equally distributed between chronic and acute failures in PPBX and failures in PPBS. The probability that gross losses of solvent to the Pu aqueous stream are not prevented by the sample analysis from POBKPA is determined as ca. 2.5 x 10-2 by evaluation of Gate G011. The frequency of solvent carry over into PP4AF due to gross losses of solvent phase material into the Pu aqueous stream is thus evaluated as ca. 8 x 10-4/yr for Gate G004.
The frequency of carry over of solvent phase material into PP4AF from gradual -101- Thus, the total frequency of solvent phase carry over into PP4AF is determined to be 2.6 x 10-3/yr.
Multiple safety devices are included in the hot water supply system to prevent supplying water at too high a temperature.
The unavailability of these safety devices is estimated by evaluation of G006 as ca. 1.0 x 10-5. and the operator error probability pi is given as input data in the FTL code. Thus, multiplying the eventual frequency of solvent carry over, 2.6 x 10-3/yr obtained for Gate G002 with the heating system unavailabilities, 1.0X10-5
for Gate G006 and 1.0 x 10-3 for Gate G007, one can obtain the occurrence frequency of the system anomaly to be 2.6 x 10-11/yr for the top gate GOOL
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The frequency of occurrence of the system anomaly initiated by Pu purification process failures such as a pulse column failure or a mixer settler failure in the German model reprocessing plant, has been evaluated by the fault tree analyses using the FTL code.
The analyzed result for the solvent carry over into the evaporator is 2.6 x 10-3/yr. If the hot water supply system fails to maintain the normal solution temperature of 117dc in the evaporator at that time, it is all the more possible to form the red oil and bring in the explosive thermal decomposition, and its probability has been analyzed to be 1 x 10-8. As a result, the frequency of occurrence of the solvent carry over with the simultaneous overheating the content of the evaporator is analyzed to be 2.6 x 10-11/yr, well less than the absolute limit for the public acceptance which might be set as 1 x 1.0-6/yr. This results are attributable to the high reliability in the design of the hot water supply system to the Pu evaporator of the German reprocessing facility.
[NOMENCLATURE] Instrumentation symbols appeared in Fig. 1 
